Financial Fair Play

[Wobblz]

Der Spiegel is killing it right now with those Football Leaks.



A couple of interesting articles that have recently come out:

Documents Show Secret Plans for Elite League of Top Clubs
A coalition that includes FC Bayern Munich spent months working on plans to create a private league of elite teams behind the backs of associations and other teams.

How Oil Money Distorts Global Football
Five years ago, UEFA introduced Financial Fair Play, a set of rules designed to level the economic playing field in European football. But during his tenure as UEFA general secretary, Gianni Infantino went out of his way to ensure that Manchester City and Paris Saint-Germain avoided harsh punishment.

How FIFA's President Failed To Clean Up Football
When Gianni Infantino took the helm at FIFA, he promised to rescue football's global governing body from the crisis in which it found itself. Yet thousands of internal memos suggest he is just the latest in a line of despots bending the global organization to their will.

 

[Bergpavian]

Havent read the FFP thing yet and hopefully i get the time to read that essay.

But on the European Super League , Rubentus and 11 other "original" clubs cant be relegated from it for 20 years.There are 5 "invited" clubs amongst which Inter is one.And we can be relegated.


Ah!! Oh so convenient for the mafioso Agnelli to have us relegated from this to satiate his and the Rubentini ego.We better not accept this deal and in no way should be sign up for this with this clause intact.2 time European champions and the experts at choking in finals in no way deserve this spot in this supposed future league above us.


Hopefully its all nonsense but Agnelli is pressuring UEFA a lot of late.Probably will be delivered a UCL trophy to keep off the pressure.Conspiracy theories and all but come on we all know aliens built the pyramid and Hitler is still alive.:chan:

I don't care. Should Inter join this league I stop being a fan anyway. I've been following the Italian league since I was a kid because thanks to many family holidays I have a strong connection to the country and its football (also its NT).

 

[ScottishInterista]

What pisses me off is that PSG and City should have been forced into a settlement agreement like us, these are the two clubs who are directly responsible for inflating the football market. Imagine if they had to confirm to our +30 million condition, they've gone well over that by 4 or 5 times in the summer windows since we were screwed. We were almost forced to sell Perisic for a cut price deal to Man U last season and how many newspapers were spouting off about us needing to sell Skriniar or Icardi, and we missed out on Rafinha and Cancelo because of our settlement. I hope Suning are looking into legal action regarding the clear bias towards those two clubs from UEFA

 

[Bluenine]

I hate this idea of the Super League. IMO any league which has no relegation will stagnate in quality. There is no incentive for bottom teams to take the competition seriously halfway through the league, and the games will end up becoming like glorified friendlies. Ultimately, if UEFA blacklists this league, the super league will slowly but surely die from its isolation. I hate this "Americanisation" of football, led by pure greed from a few clubs.

I hope this never happens.

 

[Devious]

What pisses me off is that PSG and City should have been forced into a settlement agreement like us, these are the two clubs who are directly responsible for inflating the football market. Imagine if they had to confirm to our +30 million condition, they've gone well over that by 4 or 5 times in the summer windows since we were screwed. We were almost forced to sell Perisic for a cut price deal to Man U last season and how many newspapers were spouting off about us needing to sell Skriniar or Icardi, and we missed out on Rafinha and Cancelo because of our settlement. I hope Suning are looking into legal action regarding the clear bias towards those two clubs from UEFA

If we do It right, we could sue the FIFA and demand a proper compensation, if the leaks offer solid evidence of double standard measures.

 

[Kev9Inter]

It’s claimed in Italian magazine Espresso that Roberto Mancini was paid his Manchester City salary by Al-Jazira, the Abu Dhabi club that is also owned by City patron Sheikh Mansour. That was redirected via an offshore account in Mauritius.
Among the other stories teased by Espresso magazine for tomorrow, there’s a suspected doping case involving a multi-Champions League winner and more on why Inter and Milan are treated differently over Financial Fair Play.

 

[Mad Biscione]

More reasons to be disgusted by big money football.

 

[Kramerica Industries]

As much as I think the Champions League is in need of massive overhaul, the idea of a ESL with 60% of the league immune from relegation is utter bullshit, regardless of whether we'd be in that 60% or not. There's a much better way to conduct a true championship of Europe without destroying the fabric of the domestic leagues (because that's what would happen; Serie A without Juve and the Milano sides, and/or only with them if they were poor enough to (eventually) be relegated from the ESL? Interest would die, no question. Plug in other leagues and names and you get the same idea).

As far as the settlement agreement stuff goes - UEFA, and governing football bodies in general, are utterly corrupt. News at 11. I'm just glad it's Infantino getting spotlighted here, lest anyone have ever fooled themselves for a minute that he might be considered "clean" as the now-President of FIFA. These guys reek of corruption the same way boozehounds reek of alcohol.

 

[Il Drago]

I hate this idea of the Super League. IMO any league which has no relegation will stagnate in quality. There is no incentive for bottom teams to take the competition seriously halfway through the league, and the games will end up becoming like glorified friendlies. Ultimately, if UEFA blacklists this league, the super league will slowly but surely die from its isolation. I hate this "Americanisation" of football, led by pure greed from a few clubs.

I hope this never happens.

I am not sure it's "Americanisation" of football. The closest model to this "elite league" is the Euroleague tournament in basketball.

 

[Mad Biscione]

Let's create a super league in which we are all safe :trolldad: and invite some peasant clubs so they can fight the relegation

 

[Harpsabu]

Juve and Milan were one of the original super league founders along with 9 others. Inter were not involved but the other clubs wanted to invite us to participate. Thank god, im glad we had nothing to do with that shit storm. Ofcourse those other 2 though...

 

[Kramerica Industries]

Juve and Milan were one of the original super league founders along with 9 others. Inter were not involved but the other clubs wanted to invite us to participate. Thank god, im glad we had nothing to do with that shit storm. Ofcourse those other 2 though...

Milan especially would do anything possible to get themselves back into the top-flight of Europe even if their performance hasn't merited that for several years now.

Juve wanting this to happen is totally unsurprising. They downsized their capacity when they built their stadium because they couldn't get as many people in Turin to attend their games that we can get to attend our games here in Milan even when their team is doing so much more winning than ours has. Their fanbase is so much more spread out than ours is, relatively speaking. No surprise they would be fans of this; percentage-wise, they aren't turning their backs on as many people back home as we would be.

Juventus has won the same number of European trophies as we have, btw, but I'm very glad to know we'd be assuming all the risk of relegation while they would be clear of that. Then again, I didn't need to point to Juve as being an example of that, either; PSG and Man City have won fuck-all in their European histories and they'd be clear of that risk, too.

(I guess PSG did win a trophy back in 1996, now that I look at it, but the general point stands.)

 

[Balor]

Clubs pushing for this super league should really be opening their eyes a little and realising it's going to alienate their fans big time. Every away game turning from a day road trip a few hours across the country to watch your team becoming going through hours of airport bullshit, a long flight to the away city, watch 90 minutes of football and then go through the same shit again to get home for work the next day. That shit is worth it for the Champions League because it's a rare occasion for the most prestigious tournament in club football. Doing that for a league game isn't overly realistic considering the whole thing will be won by whoever has the biggest bank account.

 

[Il Drago]

More from football leaks about Man City:

Chapter 1: Bending the Rules to the Tune of Millions

For years now, the Manchester City football club has vehemently denied that its owner, the sheikh of Abu Dhabi, broke financial rules. But internal emails tell a different story, providing evidence of backdated contracts, illusory sponsoring payments and cavalier, "We can do what we want", business practices.

Mancini had brought City its first title in almost half a century. But he would soon fall victim to his boss' ambition: Just one year later, Mancini was fired because the team proved unable to defend its title. That, apparently, is the logic adhered to by the owner: If it doesn't work, it must be replaced. But there was also a new problem: the recently introduced Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules established by UEFA, a set of budgetary statutes that came into force just a few weeks after Mancini was shown the door. First and foremost, the European football association wanted to ensure clubs didn't take on too much debt and slide into bankruptcy. Secondly, UEFA was concerned about competition in the European football leagues. They wanted to forbid clubs from spending more than they brought in.

City, though, was in danger of violating exactly that stipulation. "We will have a shortfall of 9.9m pounds in order to comply with UEFA FFP this season," Man City's Chief Financial Officer Jorge Chumillas wrote in an internal email. "The deficit is due to RM (eds: a reference to Roberto Mancini) termination. I think that the only solution left would be an additional amount of AD (eds: Abu Dhabi) sponsorship revenues that covers this gap."

In that email, Chumillas essentially revealed that his club does business a bit differently than regular football clubs. Normally, the business of football looks like this: The players play successful football, attract a growing audience, the team's games are televised, and potential sponsors take an interest. These sponsors sign contracts with the team obligating them to pay a fixed amount for the privilege of advertising with the club. This money becomes part of the team's budget for the season and can be used to sign players, pay agent fees or maintain the grass on the pitch. When the team's planning is off, or it suddenly has to spend more than called for in the business plan, the club shows a loss at the end of the season and has to cut Costs.

But Manchester City is no normal club. Costs and debt? None of that matters. And should a shortfall emerge, sponsors from the owner's home country simply send more money over. Penalties are only for those who get caught. To dodge UEFA sanctions, Man City management came up with a few creative proposals. "We could do a backdated deal for the next two years (...) paid up front," suggested club executive Simon Pearce. CEO Ferran Soriano, meanwhile, suggested having sponsors pay the team the contractually obligated bonus for winning the FA cup -- even though Man City hadn't won.

Ten days after the end of the season, Chumillas presented the results of the deliberations and declared that the details of the sponsoring contracts would be adjusted -- for the just finished season! Etihad was to suddenly pay 1.5 million pounds more, Aabar 0.5 million extra and the tourism authority a surplus of fully 5.5 million pounds. And they were all supposed to act as though that had been the deal agreed to at the beginning of the season.

The club and its sponsors were manipulating their contracts. When Chumillas asked his colleague Simon Pearce if they could change the date of payment for the sponsors from Abu Dhabi, Pearce answered in the spirit of Manchester City's executives: "Of course, we can do what we want."

These activities in spring 2013 raise doubts as to whether the Abu Dhabi-based companies are really the independent sponsors Man City representatives have consistently claimed them to be. As early as April 2010, when Pearce negotiated the sponsorship deal with Aabar, he wrote a telltale email to the firm's leadership. According to the contract, the investment company was to pay the club 15 million pounds annually. But that apparently isn't the full story. "As we discussed, the annual direct obligation for Aabar is GBP 3 million," Pearce wrote. "The remaining 12 million GBP requirement will come from alternative sources provided by His Highness." With just a single sentence, Pearce confirmed the accusations that his club had repeatedly, indignantly rejected: Namely, that His Highness, Sheikh Mansour, paid a portion of the sponsoring money himself!

That is of vital importance when it comes to UEFA's Financial Fair Play rules. If the club goes on a shopping spree with the sheikh's money, those expenditures must be declared, which quickly puts the balance sheet in the red. If, however, that money can be disguised as sponsoring money, it looks like revenues and Man City can afford larger expenditures without fear of UEFA sanctions.

Manchester City financial reports were a web of lies; the team walked all over the Financial Fair Play rules. Etihad Airways, one of the world's largest airlines, also plays along. "Etihad's direct contribution remains constant at 8m," wrote Simon Pearce in December 2013. At that time, Etihad's contractual sponsoring obligation was 35 million Pounds.

How does it work in practice? Apparently, companies like Etihad in Abu Dhabi wait for the Abu Dhabi United Group (ADUG), the holding company that belongs to Sheikh Mansour and which also owns Manchester City, to wire them money. That money is then "routed through the partners and they then forward onto us," wrote Finance Director Andrew Widdowson in an email. That, at least, is how things were done in 2015: At the time, the deal with Etihad was bringing in 67.5 million pounds annually. But Chief Financial Officer Chumillas emphasized in an email to Pearce: "Please note that out of those 67.5m pounds, 8m pounds should be funded directly by Etihad and 59.5 by ADUG."

When contacted for a response, Etihad said the financial obligations associated with the partnership with the club have always been and remain the airline's "sole liability and responsibility." The airline says it is proud it has been City's main sponsor since May 2009. Aabar and the Abu Dhabi tourism authority did not respond to the specifics of questions submitted by EIC journalists.

It is these "supplements to Abu Dhabi partnership deals," paid for by the sheikh and his "alternative sources," that are openly designed and discussed internally, but vehemently and aggressively denied in public. This is exactly what Bayern Munich President Uli Hoeness means when he complains that Abu Dhabi only has to open up the oil spigots to be able to afford expensive players. "There is almost a personification of the club with the values we hold as Abu Dhabi, as Sheikh Mansour," Khaldoon Al Mubarak said at one point after acquiring the club. Cheat until they notice?

By the time Martin Tyler screamed "Aguueeerrooooooo!" into the microphone in May 2012, internal City calculations noted that 127.5 million pounds had already been pumped in as supplements to Abu Dhabi partnership deals. That is a competitive advantage that no club in the world can keep up with, except perhaps one -- Paris Saint-German, which is bankrolled by gas-rich Qatar.

Both PSG and Manchester City negotiated settlements with UEFA in 2014 to avoid possible exclusion from the Champions League due to rules violations. Such settlements should really be intended to sanction the clubs for their cavalier business practices and the grotesquely inflated sums flowing in from state-controlled sponsors. But that went awry on two counts. For one, UEFA ultimately succumbed to the threats issued by the two teams' Gulf state owners and signed weak settlements. For another, the football association wasn't even entirely aware of the degree to which it had been deceived. It could not have known, for example, that Manchester City had set up a secret project aimed at hiding costs.

It is a remarkable story involving discrete, multimillion-pound donors to the British governing party, an Icelandic bank that went bust during the financial crisis and club executives' fears that Manchester City could ultimately come to be seen as the "global enemies of football."

http://www.spiegel.de/international/manchester-city-exposed-bending-the-rules-to-the-tune-of-millions-a-1236346.html

Chapter 2: The Secret 'Project Longbow'

A phony, multimillion-pound deal and behind-the-scenes lobbying: Before the introduction of the new Financial Fair Play rules, Manchester City did all it could to dodge spending regulations. The club insisted to UEFA it was innocent.

The path to football immortality got off to a rough start this year, on a cold, wet, East Manchester evening in September. The Man City stadium wasn't sold out and many of the VIP boxes were empty, rather surprising given that it was the team's first Champions League group match, pitting the club against Olympique Lyon. It ended in frustration, and with a surprise loss, the French team emerging with a 2:1 victory. City fans began heading for the exits in the 80th minute.

Last season, star trainer Pep Guardiola and his team had shattered numerous Premier League records. Never before had a team scored as many goals, collected as many points or won as many matches. But in the Champions League last spring, Pep's team was booted out of the tournament in the quarterfinals by FC Liverpool. In fact, City has never made it to the Champions League final; it is the last title the club must win to take its place in the pantheon of football excellence. Guardiola's contract even includes a bonus of 2 million pounds should he succeed.

That yearning for recognition -- and for the ample prize money that comes along with it -- is all tied to this accursed tournament put on by UEFA. But Manchester isn't particularly fond of UEFA. For years, the team's fans, otherwise a rather quiet lot, have passionately booed their hearts out when the Champions League hymn is played. City fans feel that they and their team have been victimized by UEFA. In particular, the penalty the team was forced to pay in 2014 due to its violations of UEFA's Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules was seen by fans as unfair.

Yet documents from the whistleblower platform Football Leaks reveal that UEFA actually showed Manchester City far too much lenience. The European football association was aware that it let City off the hook with a ludicrously low penalty, despite the club's far-reaching deception. What UEFA didn't know, however, was the vast extent of Manchester's deceit -- mendacity that began the moment in 2008 when Sheikh Mansour purchased the club.

When the new club bosses from Abu Dhabi bought the team in 2008, Man City was in poor shape. It hadn't won a Premier League title in 40 years and constantly had to play second-fiddle to its crosstown rivals, Manchester United. But they began implementing their strategy immediately: Pumping as much money into the club until it could compete, or rather, until it could impose its will on the competition. In the first two years after the ownership change, Manchester City spent over 300 million euros on new players. Sheikh Mansour's managers began catapulting the team to an altogether different class starting with the very first player transfers.

But there was a problem: UEFA's FFP rules, which prohibited clubs from spending more money than they brought in. In the worst case, teams that violated FFP provisions could be prohibited from taking part in European competitions, including the Champions League. UEFA President Michel Platini was adamant: "If a club does not keep to the rules, we will make no concessions."

No wonder Man City executives were unsettled. Their entire strategy depended on cash injections from a man who owns a 500-million-euro yacht with two helipads and who possesses one of the fastest and most expensive cars in the world, the Bugatti Veyron. And he has five of them. According to confidential club calculations, he pumped around 1.1 billion pounds into the team in just the first four years he owned Man City.

Club executives realized as early as January 2010 that the new FFP rules, which were to go into effect in 2013, would torpedo their business plan. After all, they planned to continue hemorrhaging money in the coming years. One potential response to the FFP rules would have been quite simple: City could have established new sources of revenue that were not linked to the sheikh, cut costs and lowered the expectations many had for the football project. But no: If you want to buy your way into football heaven, you can't let a few rules get in the way.

In the summer of 2010, Man City spent over 140 million euros on new players, with an additional 90 million invested the next year. Before the team's sale to the new owner from Abu Dhabi, players such as Martin Petrov, Rolando Bianchi and Georgios Samaras were on the City roster, but they soon had to make way for names like Sergio Agüero, Mario Balotelli and Carlos Tévez. In 2012, one year before the FFP rules went into effect, Man City's bookkeepers sounded the alarm. "Without significant additional revenues (...), UEFA FFP compliance WILL NOT be achieved," noted an internal presentation. Avenues to avoid non-compliance "need to be pursued aggressively."

Club leadership began searching for allies in their attempt to avert the approaching disaster. Manchester City CEO Ferran Soriano reported back to other club executives about a meeting of the European Club Association (ECA), a group representing the interests of professional teams in Europe. And he could hardly hide his disdain for those who supported the FFP rules. "They are all pushing for FFP in a way that would ashame (sic) any industry association."

He said some clubs were secretly opposed to FFP, but that they were afraid to say so openly. Which made things more difficult. "We will need to fight this," Soriano wrote in his memo, "and do it in a way that is not visible, or we will be pointed out as the global enemies of football."

Behind closed doors, they began looking for "creative solutions" to circumvent the rules, resulting in the launch of a secret project with the rather military-esque name "Project Longbow." In explaining the name, the club's chief legal adviser, Simon Cliff, noted in an internal email that the longbow was "the weapon the English used to beat the French at Crecy and Agincourt." For Man City club leadership, the enemy was apparently Michel Platini, the French UEFA president, and his signature project, FFP.

Among club employees, Project Longbow would become synonymous over the next several years with the battle against Financial Fair Play. Under Soriano's leadership, Man City established "a central model" that "allows for many of the operational costs to be shifted either fully or partially away from the club."

It is a telling window into the team's approach: High costs and losses are fine as long as they can be hidden from UEFA. To help do so, Manchester City established a subsidiary to take care of a share -- and the costs -- of some standard business activities.

For example, the club transferred the marketing rights for its players to an external company. Normally, professional teams have to pay their athletes for the right to use them in club marketing material. But City drummed up buyers for those marketing rights -- an ingenious plan. Suddenly, the club no longer had to pay the marketing fees -- the new buyers did, resulting in spending cuts for Man City. Furthermore, the sale of the marketing rights generated additional revenues for the club to present to UEFA investigators: almost 30 million euros in this case. The marketing company adopted the name Fordham Sports Management and it is "very material for our longbow target," City's chief financial officer, Jorge Chumillas, noted internally.

The deal was too good to be true. The club had brought on board two experts to construct the castle of lies: Jonathan Rowland and his father David. The senior Rowland, a well-connected investment specialist, had been in the news in previous years as a result of the millions of pounds he had donated to the Conservative Party before then being appointed party treasurer. He never actually took up the post, however, withdrawing after it came out that he had hardly paid any taxes in the UK over decades. Rowland is still considered today to be a close ally of the crown prince of Abu Dhabi.David Rowland and his son Jonathan together took over what was left of Kaupthing Bank in Iceland after its collapse during the financial crisis. The result was Banque Havilland, and a list of its branches reads like a travel guide for investors looking to avoid pesky questions and tax obligations: Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, the Bahamas, Switzerland. The owners of Fordham, the company that bought the marketing rights to Manchester City players, are likewise well-hidden: The path first leads to a British straw-man company, then to the British Virgin Islands and finally to the Rowland family trust.

Why so secretive?

Internal Manchester City documents shed light on the true nature of the deal. A concept paper shows that Fordham Sports Management is merely one element in a closed payment loop: Sheikh Mansour's holding company, Abu Dhabi United Group, transferred money to the Rowlands for the purchase of the marketing rights and to pay Man City's players for their marketing appearances. The money transfers were coordinated by Manchester City itself. Fordham, in other words, was merely a vehicle for hidden capital injections from Abu Dhabi.

Jonathan Rowland wanted additional confirmation of that. "We need to know that AD is fully behind it this is the most important thing," he wrote on April 4, 2013, to Simon Pearce, a club executive and adviser to the Abu Dhabi ruling family. In response, Pearce sought to put Rowland's mind at ease and let him in on the plan: "Regarding the ongoing operating costs, every year we will send in advance the cash of approximately 11 million." The "we" in this case is the holding company that Sheikh Mansour had used to buy Manchester City: Abu Dhabi United Group (ADUG). "I have ended up as the de facto MD (managing director) for ADUG," Pearce joked in one email to colleagues.

It was a farce: A club director was controlling the expenditures of the club owner's holding company, money that would travel around the world before landing in the team's coffers. His boss, Man City Chairman Khaldoon Al Mubarak from Abu Dhabi, with tight links to the ruling family, gave his blessing to the payments.

Neither David nor Jonathan Rowland commented on the Fordham deal when contacted by journalists with European Investigative Collaborations network.

In the first year that the new FFP rules were in effect, UEFA's Investigatory Chamber examined Manchester City's numbers. Once auditors had pored over documents filed by the club, UEFA found that Man City was in violation of Financial Fair Play. The club responded with indignance and threatened to sue UEFA, the auditors and others involved in the finding. Ultimately, the team managed to hammer out a deal with UEFA General Secretary Gianni Infantino that achieved one primary goal: avoiding anything that might hurt Manchester City.

But the negotiations between UEFA and City didn't address Fordham at all. Rather, the focus was on the value of the team's sponsoring contracts and other company entities that had been outsourced. In other words, the team's violation of the Financial Fair Play rules was far more egregious than thought.

It was only the next year that auditors from PricewaterhouseCoopers took a closer look at Fordham on behalf of UEFA. "This was a very good deal for MCFC," a PwC analyst, using the abbreviation for Manchester City Football Club, noted in a conference call with team executives. He added that he was having trouble figuring out "how Fordham expected to make a return." The response from club lawyer Simon Cliff was the pinnacle of cynicism. He didn't know, he said, because Fordham hadn't shown Manchester City its business plan. At a different point, one of Cliff's co-workers claimed that City had made the deal with Fordham because "the price was right." Of course, it was: The club had determined the price itself.

The EIC network also contacted Manchester City for comment. Officials at the club said they would not respond to the questions. "The attempt to damage the Club's reputation is organized and clear," a spokesperson wrote.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/manchester-city-and-the-fight-against-financial-fairplay-a-1236347.html

There will be two more chapters about Man City on Wednesday and Thursday.

 

[monster09]

At the time, the deal with Etihad was bringing in 67.5 million pounds annually. But Chief Financial Officer Chumillas emphasized in an email to Pearce: "Please note that out of those 67.5m pounds, 8m pounds should be funded directly by Etihad and 59.5 by ADUG."

 

[Devious]

This is so fucked up

 

[Handoyo]

The way I see FFP is, it's just a tool used by corrupt UEFA officials to extort money from clubs more efficiently.

 

[Il Drago]

UEFA statement on Financial Fair Play

UEFA has issued a statement regarding Financial Fair Play.

Financial Fair Play (FFP) has led to a step change in the health of the finances in European club football. Seven years ago, European clubs had a cumulative debt of €1.7bn. Last year, it was a profit of €600m. Without question, it has been a success for the game across Europe.

FFP is a framework which clubs that wish to play in UEFA competitions agree to abide by. It relies on the cooperation of clubs to declare a complete and genuine financial position. While UEFA can test the information it receives, it relies on that information being fair and accurate reflections of a club's finances.

UEFA conducts an annual assessment of all clubs against the break-even requirements of FFP on a rolling three-year basis. This includes a thorough assessment of clubs' financial positions on the basis of both the information disclosed by the clubs (based on their independently audited financial statements), as well as a number of compliance checks and analysis undertaken by UEFA (including independent external audits). If new information comes to light that may be material to this assessment, UEFA will use that to challenge the figures and will seek explanation, clarification or rebuttal from the club concerned.

Should new information suggest that previously concluded cases have been abused, those cases may be capable of being re-opened as determined on a case-by-case basis.

This approach is applied universally to all clubs that apply for a UEFA licence and participate in European club competitions.

https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/protecting-the-game/club-licensing-and-financial-fair-play/news/newsid=2581760.html

 

[Wobblz]

Sure sure

 

[thatdude]

Unless PSG or City are forced to sell players due to fear of being banned from European competition FFP is useless and something I’m beginning to believe was solely followed by Inter.